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GALIT A. SARFATY* 
 
Over the past two decades, there has been a drive to reduce complex concepts 
into simple numbers. Corruption, rule of law, human rights, and more have all 
been reduced to quantitative indicators. The appeal of indicators lies in their 
ability to translate social phenomena into a numerical representation that is 
transparent, easy to understand, and comparable across actors. Under the theory 
that what gets measured gets done, international law has begun relying on these 
tools to operationalize global norms and assess compliance. In particular, 
private regulatory bodies are using indicators to seek legitimacy and claim 
scientific authority as they set global standards and shape domestic law. Yet 
legal scholarship has been largely silent about the implications of these statistical 
tools for governance. 
In this Article, I analyze the prevalence of quantitative indicators as an 
emerging regulatory tool in domestic and global governance, identify the potential 
costs of using these tools to inform decision making, and offer recommendations 
on how to limit their costs and enhance their benefits. My analysis draws from 
an empirical study of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), based on personal 
interviews and participation in a GRI-certified training program. The GRI is a 
private transnational body that has produced the leading standard for 
sustainability reporting, used by more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 
250 companies. Its guidelines include 79 indicators for corporations to report on 
their social, environmental, and economic performance. 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. A.B., Harvard College, 
2000; J.D., Yale Law School, 2005; Ph.D., Anthropology, University of Chicago, 2011. I am grateful 
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Ariel Meyerstein, Nien-hê Hsieh, Benedict Kingsbury, Eric Orts, Adam Saunders, Amy Sepinwall, 
Richard Shell, David Wilkins, and David Zaring. This Article significantly benefited from my 
participation as a research scholar in NYU School of Law’s project on indicators and global 
governance and the 2012 Junior Faculty Forum at Harvard Law School. 
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Based on this study, I identify three potential costs of using indicators in 
regulation — specifically, the promotion of box ticking and superficial 
compliance, the dominance of technical experts over decision making, and the 
distortion of public values when converted to numbers. I then propose that 
government agencies and private actors design meaningful indicators and 
rankings that measure what is relevant to stakeholders, avoid data overload, 
require third-party verification, and expand participation by citizens and a 
broad group of experts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, there has been a drive to reduce 
complicated concepts into simple numbers. Corruption, rule of law, 
human rights, and more, have all been reduced to quantitative 
“indicators.” Based on the theory that what gets measured gets done, 
government agencies have incorporated quantitative indicators into 
performance-based rules, information disclosure regimes, and self-
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regulation.1 International law has recently begun using these statistical 
tools to operationalize global norms and thereby improve compliance.  
As a second-order abstraction of statistical information, indicators rely 
on numbers to represent social phenomena and evaluate performance. 
Backed by technical expertise and designed to produce comparability, 
these tools are shaping decision making by domestic and global regulatory 
bodies. For instance, the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators produce 
a ranking of developing countries based on the quality of their business 
laws and legal institutions.2 The Bank’s classification then influences its 
allocation of foreign aid as well as that of the U.S. government through the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation.3 Domestic law has also incorporated 
indicators, as in the 2008 reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act.4 This law relies on performance indicators to assess 
foreign governments’ compliance with minimum anti-trafficking standards 
and then categorize countries into three tiers.5 Given their propensity to 
simplify complex concepts and translate them into quantifiable measures, 
indicators are often used to regulate more intangible, value-laden issues 
such as the rule of law (as in the Freedom House indicators), corruption 
(as in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index), and 
human rights (as in the indicators developed by the Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor treaty compliance).6  
Indicators are playing an increasingly important role in regulatory 
governance.7 If used effectively, they can offer a number of apparent 
benefits: they can measure accountability to standards and norms; assess 
                                                          
1. See, e.g., Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The Politics of Regulation: From Institutionalism to 
New Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 107 (2011); Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting 
Childhood Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.  J. 101 (2007); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 
(1999). 
2. See World Bank, Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size 
Enterpries (2012). 
3. Id.; MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS AND THE 
SELECTION PROCESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2012). 
4. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 & 
42 U.S.C.). 
5. Id. 
6. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2010), available at, 
http://tinyurl.com/lkjquza; TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER (2009); 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for Promoting and 
Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2008/3 (June 6, 2008). 
7. Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of Global 
Governance, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 71 (2012). This paper as well as my article are part of a larger 
research project on indicators and global governance based at NYU School of Law and sponsored by 
the National Science Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The project features a 
network of scholars from several countries and has organized a series of conferences to develop a 
research agenda on this topic. See Indicators Project, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST., 
http://tinyurl.com/ln3um85 (last visited July 24, 2013). 
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compliance with policies and specific targets; and evaluate performance 
with respect to stated objectives. They can also facilitate an efficient 
processing of information and reduce the costs and resources devoted to 
decision making. The appeal of indicators lies in their ability to translate 
phenomena, such as respect for the rule of law, into a numerical 
representation that is easy to understand and compare across actors. 
Moreover, their simplicity enables more effective communication with 
those who are governed as well as the general public, thereby promoting 
ideals of transparency and accountability (at least in theory). Yet legal 
scholarship has been largely silent about the implications of indicators for 
governance. While scholars have recognized the benefits of new 
governance mechanisms,8 they have neglected to consider the limitations 
when these statistical tools are applied in practice. I contend that indicators 
are being embraced too wholeheartedly without sufficient attention to 
their costs. 
In this Article, I analyze the prevalence of quantitative indicators as an 
emerging regulatory tool in domestic and global governance, identify the 
potential costs of using these tools to inform decision making, and offer 
recommendations on how to limit their costs and enhance their benefits. 
My primary aim is not to reject the use of indicators in governance. Rather, 
I propose ways in which government agencies and private actors can more 
effectively use these tools in regulation to meaningfully compare units of 
analysis and evaluate performance. I argue that indicators can serve as 
effective tools provided that they measure what is relevant to stakeholders, 
are designed by a broad group of experts and citizens, and are backed by 
reliable data. This Article contributes to scholarly debates on the 
effectiveness of new governance mechanisms in regulation as well as the 
legitimacy of private regulatory bodies, which have become key players in 
international governance.9 
                                                          
8. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 
115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1534 (2006) (“Institutions involved in international decisionmaking should be 
required to develop indicators and metrics that track issues of concern, and to collect data on a basis 
that is comparable across jurisdictions. A data-driven policy evaluation structure that gauges 
institutional performance can trigger competitive pressures and support a more empirical approach 
to decisionmaking, thereby contributing to policymaking effectiveness.”). 
9. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); 
BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY (2004); NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS (Math Noortmann & Cedric 
Ryngaert eds. 2010); MYRIAM SENN, NON-STATE REGULATORY REGIMES: UNDERSTANDING 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION (2011); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2004); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle: Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global 
Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (2005) (reviewing Anne-Marie Slaughter’s book); 
Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 262 (2004); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private 
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Indicators address a visceral desire of policymakers to find mechanisms 
that can increase compliance with rules, a problem particularly acute in 
international law. Given its lack of coercive force, international law must 
rely on other means to affect state and non-state behavior. Scholars have 
studied the role of reputation, reciprocity, and acculturation, among other 
factors, in enhancing international law’s ability to shape policy and decision 
making.10 An emerging but as yet under-studied mechanism is the power 
of numbers.  
Private regulatory bodies have emerged as significant players in the 
production and enforcement of international law.11 However, the 
legitimacy of private actors is questionable given their lack of public 
accountability, an absence of oversight mechanisms, and possible 
manipulation by special interests.12 Private regulatory bodies have recently 
turned to indicators to claim scientific authority, affirm legal values such as 
transparency and predictability, and assert their legitimacy to govern. Yet 
when indicators translate legal norms into quantifiable metrics, there are 
unintended consequences.  
My analysis of indicators is based on an empirical study of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), a private regulatory body that has produced the 
leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting. The GRI guidelines 
include seventy-nine indicators on which corporations self-report on their 
social, environmental, and economic performance and are then assigned a 
score of A, B, or C.13 According to a 2008 study by the accounting firm 
KPMG, more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 250 companies 
use GRI guidelines as the basis for their reporting.14 An increasing number 
of countries (including France, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden) have 
                                                                                                                                      
Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
225 (2005); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global 
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007). 
10. See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY (2010); Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 
(2006); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated 
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005). 
11. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: 
The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1573 (2011); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007). 
12. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts Review of Transnational Private 
Regulation, (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 125) available at 
http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art125/; Esty, supra note 8. 
13. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2011), 
available at http://tinyurl.com/88jjve9. 
14. KPMG INT’L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
REPORTING (2008). 
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recently mandated sustainability disclosure by companies (some of which 
rely on GRI guidelines), while many others are actively considering such a 
regime and have already adopted voluntary sustainability reporting 
standards.15 In addition, mainstream institutional investors, not just socially 
responsible ones, are increasingly considering sustainability performance in 
their investment decisions and thus consulting GRI reports. 
As the case of the GRI illustrates, indicators facilitate the process by 
which legal norms are interpreted and implemented, particularly in areas of 
international law where norms may be ill defined and traditional 
enforcement mechanisms are absent. For instance, the GRI indicators aim 
to make corporate sustainability reporting more mainstream as part of a 
larger goal of achieving corporate accountability. In this way, they are 
operationalizing emerging norms on corporate responsibility for human 
rights, among other issues. Soft law instruments such as the U.N. Global 
Compact lack independent monitoring and enforcement and have been 
criticized for being conceptually vague and difficult to implement.16 While 
advocates have turned to U.S. litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited its exterritorial application.17 The 
GRI is an example of an alternative approach — information regulation 
through numbers — for changing corporate behavior.18 It represents a 
shift in governance towards data-based tools such as quantitative 
indicators to enhance compliance with legal norms.  
Yet my study of the GRI demonstrates that the use of quantitative 
indicators can be fraught with problems, which are often overlooked due 
                                                          
15. KPMG INT’L ET AL., CARROTS AND STICKS: PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY (2010). Moreover, the European Commission hosted a series of six workshops 
between September 2009 and February 2010 on the disclosure of ESG information by companies. 
See Workshops on Disclosure, EUR. COMMISSION, http://tinyurl.com/ybca7ox (last updated May, 2 
2013). The final workshop report suggested the possibility of using the GRI as a reference point in 
future European policy. European Workshops on Disclosure of Environmental, Social and Governance 
Information, Final Workshop, Summary of Discussions, p. 16 (Feb. 25, 2010). 
16. Created in 2000, the UN Global Compact is a voluntary initiative to encourage companies to 
embrace nine principles drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Labor Organization’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on 
Environment and Development. See United Nations Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited July 24, 2013). 
17. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroelum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). The Alien Tort Claims Act 
allows U.S. district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).  
18. Information regulation has become prevalent in the field of environmental law. See, e.g., David 
W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 
U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 115 (2004); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 
18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar & 
James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of Information for Environmental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347 
(2008). 
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to the authoritative quality of numbers. For instance, one potential cost of 
indicators is the promotion of box ticking and superficial compliance, as 
evident in the GRI’s system of grading reports. Companies that issue GRI 
reports receive a grade of A, B, or C based on the quantity of indicators 
that they report on, rather than the quality of their performance.19 In 
addition, because third-party verification is optional, NGOs do not trust 
the data behind the indicators. We therefore see that the motivation 
behind the GRI is not whether the reports are credible to NGOs or 
whether they reflect a company’s good or bad performance, but that more 
and more companies participate which perpetuates the existence of the 
GRI and raises its status as the leading standard for corporate sustainability 
reporting. In this way, the GRI has strayed from its original audience of 
consumers and NGOs, and its initial aim of corporate accountability. The 
use of indicators as ends, in and of themselves, has threatened the 
perceived legitimacy of the organization that produces and relies on them.  
My analysis of the GRI applies an anthropological approach as I look 
inside the black box of indicators and analyze the various stages in which 
they are implicated in governance, including their production, 
implementation, and impact. Towards that end, I have conducted 
interviews with the producers of the indicators (members of the GRI’s 
secretariat in Amsterdam and its New York City office), users (company 
officials that use GRI guidelines in their sustainability reports), consumers 
(investors and NGOs who read GRI reports), and U.S. government 
representatives (SEC officials who are considering whether to mandate 
disclosure on environmental and social issues as part of securities filings). 
In addition, I have participated in a GRI-certified training program in 
order to look behind the numbers and understand how GRI reports are 
made and evaluated.  
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I analyzes the prevalence of 
indicators as a tool of domestic and international governance and then 
explores the broader historical and sociological context that explains their 
emergence in policymaking. Part II describes the development of the GRI 
as the leading standard for corporate sustainability reporting and its impact 
on regulation and financial markets. Part III draws upon the case study to 
outline the potential costs of using indicators, including the promotion of 
superficial compliance, the dominance of technical experts over decision 
making, and the distortion of public values when converted to numbers. 
Finally, Part IV offers recommendations on how to enhance the promise 
and minimize the perils of using indicators. In order to maximize their 
effectiveness, I propose that government agencies and private actors 
                                                          
19. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI APPLICATION LEVELS (2011), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/ny9gtek. 
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design meaningful indicators and rankings that measure what is relevant to 
stakeholders, avoid data overload, require third-party verification, and 
expand participation by citizens and a broad group of experts. 
I. INDICATORS AS A TOOL OF REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 
A regulatory tool that has become increasingly prevalent in domestic 
and international governance is the indicator, defined as follows: 
An indicator is a named, rank-ordered representation of past or 
projected performance by different units that uses numerical data 
to simplify a more complex social phenomenon, drawing on 
scientific expertise and methodology. The representation is capable 
of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as 
countries or persons), and to evaluate their performance by 
reference to one or more standards.20 
Comprising such aggregators as indices, rankings, and composites, 
indicators serve as second-order abstractions of statistical information and 
are used to evaluate performance according to a standard.21 
Indicators attempt to imbue a technocratic rationality into decision 
making and, by doing so, render domains (however complex, such as 
health or criminality) calculable and susceptible to evaluation and 
intervention. A guise of neutrality and objectivity exists behind these tools 
and masks underlying power relations. Their effectiveness depends on 
experts with specialized skills and esoteric knowledge — “[e]xperts hold 
out the hope that problems of regulation can remove themselves from the 
disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet seductive 
territory of truth.”22 Given their ability to translate phenomena into a 
numerical representation that is transparent, easy to understand, and 
comparable across actors, indicators are increasingly incorporated in 
domestic regulation and international law. 
A. The Prevalence of Indicators in Domestic Regulation 
Domestic agencies frequently incorporate indicators into “new 
governance” mechanisms, which comprise alternative regulatory strategies 
that impact the behavior of business and other organizations.23 These 
approaches include performance-based rules, information disclosure 
                                                          
20. Davis et al., supra note 7, at 2. 
21. Id. 
22. PETER MILLER & NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE PRESENT: ADMINISTERING 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE 69 (2008).  
23. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1. See also THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO 
THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001). 
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regimes, voluntary programs, and self-regulation, all of which offer 
regulated entities more flexibility than traditional regimes.24 New 
governance mechanisms stand in contrast to command and control 
methods that rely on specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior. 
These methods are not mutually exclusive, for instance a voluntary 
program could feature a performance-based standard or a self-regulatory 
regime could be based on information disclosure rules. 
Rather than specifying a certain behavior, performance-based regulation 
sets measurable outcomes and often entails the application of performance 
indicators. It provides regulated entities with the flexibility to develop 
innovative, cost-effective methods to achieve a performance standard.25 
Recent administrations have promoted the use of performance goals in 
designing regulations. For example, former President Clinton’s Executive 
Order No. 12866 directs agencies “to the extent feasible, [to] specify 
performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of 
compliance that regulated entities must adopt.”26 President Obama 
reaffirmed this principle in a 2011 Executive Order and further called for 
“evidence-based regulation.”27 A variety of performance-based 
governmental initiatives incorporate indicators. A prominent example is 
the No Child Left Behind Act, signed into law in January 2002.28 This 
federal legislation requires schools to achieve specified academic results as 
measured by a variety of indicators — for example, the percentage of 
students who are at or above the proficient levels in reading and math; the 
percentage of classes being taught by “highly qualified” teachers; and the 
percentage of students who drop out of school.29 Another example is the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Reactor Oversight Process, which relies 
on a series of performance indicators to monitor the safety of commercial 
nuclear power reactors.30  
Like performance-based regulation, informational regulation does not 
mandate specific behavioral change; it instead requires actors to collect and 
disclose information which is often based on indicators.31 Information 
disclosure requirements feature prominently in regulation on such areas as 
                                                          
24. See Lobel, supra note 9. 
25. See Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1, at 114; Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based 
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 
(2003); Sugarman & Sandman, supra note 1. 
26. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(8), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
27. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1(b)(4), 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011); The Regulatory Plan, 
75 Fed. Reg. 79,455 (Dec. 20, 2010). 
28. No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended 
primarily in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
29. Id. 
30. See US NRC Reactor Oversight Process, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://tinyurl.com/kqm372w (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
31. See sources cited supra note 18. 
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corporate financial reporting, environmental protection, auto safety, and 
campaign finance. For instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory requires periodic disclosure of 
industrial release of toxic chemicals as an indicator of a firm’s 
environmental performance.32 This form of regulation can serve a variety 
of purposes: “provid[ing] information to the public to correct for 
information asymmetries,” “promot[ing] more informed consent or 
deliberation,” and “chang[ing] the behavior of the firm by making 
managers more aware of and concerned about their organization’s social 
outputs.”33  
Finally, there are voluntary government programs and self-regulation 
efforts by business, which rely on incentives and social pressure to bring 
about behavioral change. Voluntary government programs reward 
participants “by offering educational resources, financial assistance, awards 
and certifications, and exemptions from more formal requirements.”34 
One such program that is also performance-based is the EPA’s National 
Environmental Performance Track, which operated from 2000 through 
2009.35 This initiative provided regulatory and administrative benefits (e.g., 
reduced inspections) to firms that achieved superior levels of 
environmental performance.36 It also worked with participating firms to 
improve performance based on a variety of environmental indicators, 
including water use, greenhouse gas emissions, and hazardous waste 
generation.37 
Industry groups, non-governmental organizations, and standards-setting 
bodies administer and enforce initiatives of self-regulation, which depend 
on the cooperation of firms for their compliance.38 While these efforts are 
sometimes largely symbolic and an attempt to avert more stringent 
government action,39 they can potentially leverage market or activist 
pressure to bring about desired behavior. There are also instances where 
                                                          
32. What Is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Program?, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,  
http://tinyurl.com/m23ym3r (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as 
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 
257 (2001). 
33. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management To 
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003). 
34. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1, at 116. 
35. See National Environmental Performance Track, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
36. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 1, at 117. 
37. Id. 
38. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9; VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE 
FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001); 
CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND 
DEMOCRACY (2002). 
39. See Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW 
& POL’Y 529, 531 (1997) (describing common fears of those who oppose self-regulation). 
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self-regulation has transitioned into formal regulation.40 When used as part 
of corporate self-regulation, indicators can serve as useful diagnostic tools 
that facilitate problem solving and strategy development. They gauge the 
magnitude and scope of a problem and measure progress over time toward 
clearly defined goals. For example, the chemical industry’s Responsible 
Care Program prescribes voluntary codes of practice for participating 
companies to improve their environmental, health, and safety 
performance.41 Launched in 1985 by the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, the program requires companies to measure progress using 
performance indicators, such as energy consumption and number of 
fatalities.42 By motivating actors to set priorities, design strategies, and 
assess their behavior, indicators (such as those used in the Responsible 
Care Program) can help firms manage their resources in order to achieve 
improvements in performance. 
B. Indicators in International Law 
The innovative regulatory practices described above are beginning to 
appear in the international system, thus creating a model of “transnational 
new governance.”43 Indicators are increasingly becoming a prominent 
feature in global governance, as they operationalize legal principles and 
provide a mechanism to measure compliance (frequently as part of a 
ranking of states or firms). A variety of actors are relying on indicators for 
the implementation of international law. First, UN treaty bodies and the 
U.S. State Department are incorporating indicators into their compliance 
assessments of international human rights standards. Second, indicators 
are guiding the decision making of international organizations and 
domestic aid agencies and thus indirectly shaping the laws of countries 
seeking development assistance. Finally, private standard-setting 
institutions are using indicators to evaluate and implement global norms as 
they facilitate their incorporation into domestic law.  
Indicators are playing an important role in the monitoring of 
international legal norms and the imposition of sanctions on foreign 
governments. For instance, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
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43. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational 
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Human Rights has developed human rights indicators to assist treaty 
bodies in their monitoring of major human rights conventions.44 The 
treaty bodies can thereby more efficiently process state party reports and 
monitor countries’ performance over time.45 On the domestic front, the 
U.S. State Department uses indicators to evaluate and rank foreign 
governments’ compliance with international standards of antitrafficking 
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).46 On the basis of 
the TVPA rankings, the United States imposes sanctions on countries that 
are not making efforts to meet minimum standards. 
Intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank are indirectly 
shaping domestic law through country rankings that are based on 
indicators. The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators classify countries 
based on the quality of their business laws and legal institutions.47 These 
indicators guide the allocation of development aid by not only the World 
Bank but also the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United 
States’s Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other multilateral 
development banks. Countries are therefore motivated to reform their 
laws in order to rank higher and garner more foreign aid.48 While the 
World Bank produces its Doing Business indicators in-house, it also relies 
on indicators produced by NGOs (e.g., those on corruption by 
Transparency International and on human rights by Freedom House) 
when determining eligibility for aid.49  
Finally, private standard-setting organizations are relying on indicators 
to interpret and implement global norms while also facilitating their 
transition into domestic regulation. For instance, the GRI has developed 
guidelines, including a set of seventy-nine indicators, to implement global 
norms on corporate sustainability reporting.50 As a non-state actor, the 
GRI cannot enforce compliance by requiring all companies to report on 
their performance using its indicators. But it has influenced governments 
and stock exchanges to model their standards for sustainability reporting 
on its guidelines.51 Thus, the GRI guidelines are not only indirectly shaping 
                                                          
44. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 6, at 10–15. 
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51. See infra Part II.B. 
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domestic law but are also themselves adopted as part of mandatory and 
voluntary standards. 
Transnational governance regimes frequently address collective action 
problems (e.g., climate change) and coordination problems (e.g., 
harmonizing accounting standards) as they draw upon specialized 
expertise.52 Private bodies, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), the International Accounting Standards Board, and 
the Fair Labor Association, bypass government involvement and 
independently set standards on safety, accounting, and labor rights for 
developing countries.53 While private bodies may replace direct 
governmental regulation or regulate areas not subject to governmental 
oversight, they raise important legitimacy concerns given their lack of 
public accountability.54 On the legitimacy of supranational bodies, Daniel 
Esty observes: “When a matter is largely scientific or technical, having 
designated supranational experts address the problem may be 
uncontroversial. As an issue becomes more political or normatively 
charged, however, delegation to those lacking electoral legitimacy becomes 
increasingly problematic.”55 Data exchange or policy benchmarking are 
examples of activities with a scientific or technical focus that could 
“establish the legitimacy of policymaking.”56 This is where indicators come 
in.  
Indicators are an important tool for private transnational institutions 
that are vulnerable to criticisms of accountability and legitimacy. They 
provide private actors with an easily accessible tool that allows them to 
efficiently process information, attract public attention, and govern the 
conduct of others. While non-state actors lack enforcement power, they 
appeal to indicators to provide them with scientific authority and the 
leverage to pressure actors to comply with their standards. By relying on 
indicators, they can exert their power indirectly by “taking what is 
essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political 
discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science.”57 As a result, 
their credibility is increased and their power is less subject to contestation. 
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C. The Sociological and Historical Factors Behind the Power of Numbers 
In order to command scientific authority, indicators rely on numbers, as 
they serve as second-order abstractions of complex phenomena. Numbers 
construct new categories and new relations among people and things 
through standardization and commensurability and, in the process, 
“profoundly transform what we choose to do, who we try to be, and what 
we think of ourselves.”58 Commensuration fosters detachment by 
objectifying subjective values, standardizing relations between often 
disparate characteristics, and enabling a depersonalization that is critical for 
bureaucratic and economic rationality.59 This process “changes the terms 
of what can be talked about, how we value, and how we treat what we 
value.”60  
Commensuration (through such tools as indicators) is a means of 
managing uncertainty, depersonalizing relations, imposing control, 
securing legitimacy, and enforcing discipline.61 Numbers serve as a 
“technology of distance,”62 whose authority comes from “their capacity to 
create and overcome distance, both physical and social.”63 They abstract 
away the individual and the local while also creating a universal language 
that transcends distance.64 In this way, objectivity through numbers 
becomes a proxy for truth and fairness. In her study of human rights 
indicators, Sally Engle Merry contends that indicators “convey an aura of 
objective truth and facilitate comparisons. However, indicators typically 
conceal their political and theoretical origins and underlying theories of 
social change and activism.”65 Merry further notes that “[a] key dimension 
of the power of indicators [and other technologies of audit] is their 
capacity to convert complicated, contextually variable phenomena into 
unambiguous, clear, and impersonal measures.”66 Numbers display 
governmentality because they serve as a technology of power that 
constitutes populations and makes individuals calculable and therefore 
governable — both by others and themselves. They create “a promise of 
control” through the administration of everyday life — for instance, they 
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reassure citizens “against the uncertainties of poverty, crime, 
unemployment, and more recently environmental and technological 
risk.”67  
Why have officials and the public at large come to appreciate and even 
demand numbers to solve problems, make decisions, and exert control? 
Quantification methods have achieved considerable prestige and power in 
the modern world.68 We see the prevalence of cost-benefit analysis in U.S. 
government bureaucracies since the early-twentieth century as well as 
within economics since the mid-twentieth century. State bureaucrats 
introduced cost-benefit methods and other accounting technologies to 
achieve uniformity and public trust, and to dispel the notion that their 
decisions were arbitrary and biased given that they lacked the mandate of a 
popular election.69 The notion of statistics as the science of the state 
suggests how the accumulation and tabulation of facts (e.g., through 
censuses, tax returns, and crime figures) transforms reality and the 
qualitative world into a calculable form (i.e., what Ian Hacking calls “the 
taming of chance”), and thus makes it susceptible to evaluation and 
intervention.70  
The emergence of indicators as techniques of governance is part of the 
broader prevalence of economic expertise within the world of 
bureaucracies as well as in domestic and international public policymaking. 
Economic knowledge has diffused across national bureaucracies in many 
countries throughout the twentieth century.71 Marion Fourcade argues that 
“[e]conomics has become central to the nation . . . because the nation has 
become more economic.”72 The globalization of economics and the 
economic profession is related to the global circulation of capital (e.g., 
through public aid and foreign direct investment) and the resulting 
economic interdependence of nations.73 The globalization of the law has 
also created opportunities for economists to enter legal arenas 
worldwide.74 As Fourcade demonstrates, there has been a “transformation 
of economic knowledge into a technology of political and bureaucratic 
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power,” including a global diffusion of the neoclassical paradigm for 
economies, independent of local or historical context.75  
Economists, statisticians, and accountants are playing a central role in 
the data collection and information processing required for developing and 
applying indicators. They decide what should be counted, the methods of 
collecting data, and how that data should then be interpreted and 
aggregated. When indicators are used as a regulatory tool and become 
incorporated into law, these experts exert a significant influence over 
political decision making, as I will demonstrate in the case of the GRI. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE AS 
THE LEADING STANDARD FOR CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING 
The field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fertile area for the 
use of indicators. Scholars have argued that companies have legal 
obligations under international law, particularly for violations of human 
rights, labor rights, and environmental protection.76 A variety of initiatives 
have aimed to hold multinational companies accountable under domestic 
or international law but they have remained largely ineffective. The 
extraterritorial operations of companies are largely unregulated through 
domestic law, with the exception of litigation under the U.S. Alien Tort 
Claims Act, whose extraterritorial application to corporations was recently 
curtailed by the U.S. Supreme Court.77 International, regional, and non-
governmental organizations, such as the UN, the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and the ISO, have drafted standards and 
principles addressed to companies (e.g., the UN Global Compact and ISO 
26000) and governments (e.g., the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy).78 However, these voluntary 
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instruments lack independent monitoring, implementation, enforcement 
mechanisms, do not include performance metrics to assess compliance, 
and are not certifiable.79 Self-regulatory initiatives by the private sector 
(e.g., codes of conduct and industry programs) may have a normative 
impact on corporate behavior, but are devoid of third-party accountability 
systems and subject to critiques of greenwashing.80 
As John Ruggie, the then-UN Special Representative on Business and 
Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, concluded: 
[T]here is no single silver bullet solution to the multi-faceted 
challenges of business and human rights . . . . [T]he tools available 
for dealing with business and human rights differ from those 
addressing State-based human rights violations, where only public 
international law can impose binding obligations. The business and 
human rights domain is considerably more complex . . . . Moreover, 
the standards that business initiatives incorporate are typically self-
defined rather than tracking internationally recognized human 
rights. And accountability mechanisms for ensuring adherence to 
the standards tend to remain weak and decoupled from firms’ own 
core oversight and control systems.81 
This state of affairs is ripe for governance through indicators. Given that 
the international legal duties of corporations remain “ill-defined and 
ineffective,”82 technologies of compliance can substitute for legal 
regulation.83 If incorporated into domestic law, indicators can give teeth to 
international legal norms by serving as a tool for evaluation and 
implementation. 
Enter the Global Reporting Initiative. The GRI was created in 1997 as a 
framework for corporations to report on their environmental, social, and 
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economic performance.84 Its guidelines have become the global standard 
for corporate sustainability reporting. They currently consist of standard 
disclosures (e.g., organizational profile, stakeholder engagement, and 
report parameters), reporting principles (e.g., materiality, stakeholder 
inclusiveness, and accuracy), and, most notably, a set of seventy-nine 
indicators (sub-divided into fifty core indicators and twenty-nine additional 
indicators).85 Many indicators incorporate legal standards on such issues as 
corporate governance, human rights, anti-discrimination, labor, corruption, 
and the environment; they also reference a variety of international 
agreements, including ILO conventions, OECD Guidelines, and U.N. 
international human rights conventions.86 The indicators attempt to 
convert legal norms into quantifiable metrics that are easily compared 
across corporations and serve as a benchmark for improving performance. 
While the GRI framework is a voluntary self-regulatory initiative 
developed by a private, network-based organization, it is moving into the 
realm of hard law through incorporation into mandatory regulations.87 The 
GRI has influenced state governments and stock exchanges to adopt 
binding and non-binding corporate disclosure standards based on its 
guidelines. According to a recent study using data from fifty-eight 
countries, mandatory disclosure of sustainability information has 
significant consequences on socially responsible managerial practices.88 
This research suggests that regulation based on GRI indicators has the 
potential to improve corporate behavior.  
A. Overview of the GRI 
“What you cannot measure, you cannot manage. What you cannot 
manage, you cannot change.”89 This motto has motivated the GRI since it 
was founded in Boston by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies (CERES).90 Supported by the UN Environment Program, the 
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GRI receives funds from foundations, governments, and corporate 
sponsors, and also generates income by directly providing services to GRI 
users (e.g., training programs, executive seminars, and software tools).91 It 
aims to empower civil society organizations to seek greater accountability 
for corporate governance.92 Following a model of information regulation, 
a GRI report would presumably “mobiliz[e] its recipients to demand 
certain performance levels and enabl[e] activists and NGOs to reward 
practices considered socially responsible and exert pressure on poor 
performers.”93 The GRI seeks to raise sustainability reporting to the same 
status as financial reporting by developing metrics for companies to 
disclose on intangible assets such as human rights and environmental 
performance.94 By presenting this information in a comparable and 
consistent format through quantifiable measures, the GRI attempts to 
signal that these intangibles have market value and can affect the financial 
health of a company.  
The GRI bases its legitimacy on a multi-stakeholder consultation 
process among intergovernmental organizations, businesses, NGOs, and 
labor unions.95 It is comprised of four permanent bodies: the Board of 
Directors, the Secretariat based in Amsterdam (employing more than fifty 
people), the Technical Advisory Committee, and the Stakeholder 
Council.96 The Technical Advisory Committee is responsible for the 
development and revision of the reporting framework, while the 
Stakeholder Council deliberates on key strategic and policy issues, and 
appoints the Board of Directors.97 The Stakeholder Council’s sixty 
members are geographically representative and include twenty-two seats 
for business, sixteen seats for NGOs, six seats for labor, and sixteen seats 
for so-called “mediating institutions” (which include accounting and 
consulting firms, foundations, and governments).98 Most of the members 
of the Stakeholder Council are elected by a group of Organizational 
Stakeholders, which include hundreds of organizations and individuals and 
is dominated by large businesses and international consulting and 
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accounting firms, with relatively few NGOs and organized labor 
associations.99  
The GRI has formed alliances with a variety of institutional partners 
and promotes convergence around other corporate social responsibility 
guidelines and principles.100 The most notable is between the GRI and the 
UN Global Compact, which was announced in October 2006.101 As part 
of this alliance, the GRI’s guidelines incorporate the Global Compact’s 
requirements for signatory companies that annually report a 
Communication on Progress.102 The GRI and the Global Compact have 
also published a draft tool to guide companies in linking the two reporting 
processes.103 The GRI has formed linkages with other standards, including 
the International Finance Corporation’s sustainability performance 
standards, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), ISO 26000, and the 
OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.104 These alliances serve 
to deflect competition from similar initiatives such as the CDP, whose 
climate change reporting framework is used by over 3,000 companies 
around the world.105 
The GRI guidelines are voluntary and incremental, and include a high 
level of flexibility, allowing companies to decide which principles and 
indicators to adopt.106 They are designed to improve over time to reflect 
lessons learned and the changing expectations of companies and 
stakeholders. The first Sustainability Reporting Guidelines were established 
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in 2000. The GRI released its second generation of guidelines (G2) in 
2002, and then its third version (G3) in late 2006.107 The G3 guidelines 
were the product of a two-year development process which involved about 
3,000 stakeholders worldwide and provided public comment 
opportunities.108 Among the revisions from G2 to G3 are the elaboration 
of methods for calculating indicators, the requirement of disclosure of an 
organization’s management approach, and broad applicability of the 
guidelines to private and public actors, including small and large 
companies, NGOs, and public agencies. The GRI has recently completed 
updates in the areas of human rights, gender, community impacts, and 
materiality, which resulted in its G3.1 guidelines (released in March 
2011).109 Finally, in October 2010, the GRI announced that it will begin 
developing the fourth generation of its guidelines (G4), which are 
scheduled to be released in 2013.110 The general aim behind G4 is to 
increase the robustness of the guidelines in order to further mainstream 
sustainability reporting and eventually combine it with financial reporting 
as part of one “integrated report.”111  
In accordance with the quantity (but not quality) of disclosure, 
companies self-declare their score as A, B, or C, which the GRI refers to 
as its “application level.”112 Companies at level C have reported on a 
minimum of ten GRI indicators, including at least one from each of the 
environmental, social, and economic categories. Level B means that 
companies have disclosed their management approach (e.g., their goals, 
monitoring, and relevant policies) and reported on at least twenty 
indicators, with at least one from each of the environmental and economic 
categories as well as one from each of the social sub-categories of human 
rights, labor, society, and product responsibility. Level A means that 
companies have disclosed their management approach and reported on all 
fifty core indicators, or alternatively, explained the reason why certain 
indicators were omitted (such as a lack of materiality for the company). As 
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part of this process, companies undergo a materiality test to determine 
which issues to report on based on such factors as what is important to 
stakeholders, the existence of relevant laws and regulations, and whether 
the issue may pose a significant risk. Level A companies must also report 
on indicators in its sector supplement, if one is available. Finally, 
companies have the option of adding a “+” to their level (e.g., an A+) if a 
third-party assurance provider has verified its data. Therefore, if no “+” is 
present, there has been no external verification of the information in a 
company’s GRI report.113   
While companies could choose from over thirty different reporting 
frameworks in the 1990s, the GRI has now become “the de facto 
international reporting standard.”114 According to a 2008 study by the 
accounting firm KPMG, more than three-quarters of the Global Fortune 
250 companies and nearly seventy percent of the 100 largest companies by 
revenue use GRI guidelines as the basis for their reporting.115 As of 2013, 
there were at least 5,470 organizations reporting in eighty-one countries, 
based on those that submitted their reports to the GRI.116 What is the 
motivation for companies to use GRI?  
In jurisdictions where there is no mandatory regulation to report on 
sustainability, there are a variety of reasons why companies nevertheless 
choose to do so — e.g., gaining competitive advantage through “improved 
management of ESG [(environmental, social, and governance)] impacts 
and overall risk, enhancement of company reputation, and a greater ability 
to attract and retain both customers and talent.”117 As part of a strategic 
approach, companies use the GRI guidelines to develop internal metrics 
that track their social and environmental performance, identify potential 
risks, and integrate sustainability goals with their overall business 
objectives. In addition, companies may feel pressure to report because 
their industry peers are doing so, or in order to deflect civil society 
pressure after a prominent environmental or human rights incident. In this 
case, reporting may be part of a public relations exercise and not reflect 
any real desire to enhance performance.  
There have been a number of critiques of the GRI, both by NGOs and 
companies themselves. NGOs have criticized the GRI for its division of 
indicators into core indicators and additional ones that are optional and up 
to the discretion of companies to include, even if they may be important to 
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certain stakeholders. Civil society groups have also questioned the 
credibility of third-party verification services (usually performed by private 
accounting and consulting firms), given that there are no uniform 
guidelines to ensure their reliability.118 At the same time, companies have 
complained that they are on a “reporting treadmill,” where they spend so 
much time gathering data that they are left with few resources to 
implement changes in the organization.119 Finally, there is a general 
concern that the GRI ranks reports based on the level of disclosure (e.g., 
the number of indicators that companies report on) rather than the quality 
and accuracy of a firm’s sustainability performance.120 I will expand upon 
these critiques in Part III in my discussion of the unintended 
consequences of using indicators like the GRI. 
B. The GRI’s Impact on Domestic Regulation and Financial Markets 
The GRI has moved into the realm of hard law by shaping regulation by 
regional organizations, states, and stock exchanges. It has recently begun 
promoting mandatory government regulation on sustainability reporting as 
well as integrated reporting within the global financial framework, as 
evidenced by a recent session on the topic at the 2011 World Economic 
Forum.121 The primary motivation behind the GRI’s lobbying efforts is 
that the majority of companies are still not reporting on sustainability. 
About 4,000 companies are currently issuing CSR reports, which 
represents a ten-fold increase since the mid-1990s.122 Just over one-third of 
those reporters (about 1,400 companies) used the GRI guidelines in 
2009.123 As previously mentioned, three-quarters of the Global Fortune 
250 companies use the GRI.124 That means that many small and medium-
sized companies are still not using the GRI, or issuing sustainability 
reports at all. In an effort to increase participation, the GRI has recently 
begun encouraging regulation in the disclosure of environmental and social 
issues. 
The GRI’s promotion of regulation represents a significant shift in its 
role and mission, from an independent organization that encourages 
companies to voluntarily report on sustainability to a more advocacy-
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oriented organization that is partnering with governments to promote 
mandatory reporting. While states had historically only provided funding 
to the GRI and had no direct involvement in its operation, they are now 
actively participating in its decision making process. In connection with 
this shift, the GRI established a Governmental Advisory Group in 2008 to 
provide advice to its Board of Directors and executive team, and suggest 
ways of increasing GRI participation through regulatory initiatives.125 The 
Governmental Advisory Group is also trying to resolve institutional and 
legislative fragmentation on sustainability reporting.126 In addition, in 2009 
the GRI Board signed the Amsterdam Declaration, which cites the recent 
global financial crisis and lack of trust in economic institutions as a 
justification for more transparency in economic, social, and governance 
(ESG) reporting.127 The declaration calls on governments to strengthen 
the global sustainability reporting regime: 
[T]he Board of the GRI calls on governments to take leadership by: 
1. Introducing policy requiring companies to report on ESG 
factors or publicly explain why they have not done so. 
2. Requiring ESG reporting by their public bodies — in 
particular: state owned companies, government pension funds 
and public investment agencies. 
3. Integrating sustainability reporting within the emerging 
global financial regulatory framework being developed by leaders 
of the G20.128 
In support of the Amsterdam Declaration, the GRI is working closely with 
governments to pass regulations on sustainability reporting. 
The current regulatory landscape reflects a movement towards more 
government-sponsored legislation, standards, and guidelines on 
sustainability reporting. According to a 2010 report, there are 142 country 
standards that include a sustainability-related reporting requirement or 
guidance.129 Two-thirds of those regulations are mandatory, and a number 
of them explicitly cite GRI guidelines.130  
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European countries, in particular, are at the forefront of mandatory 
reporting regulations. France was one of the earliest countries to mandate 
ESG disclosure. Its 2001 New Economic Regulation requires all listed 
companies to report on forty social and environmental criteria in their 
annual reports.131 The Swedish government requires state-owned 
enterprises to issue sustainability reports in accordance with GRI’s G3 
guidelines and subject to external assurance.132 Spain similarly enacted 
legislation that requires state-owned companies and businesses with over 
1,000 employees to produce sustainability reports beginning in 2012.133 As 
of 2009, Denmark requires disclosure of CSR activities in financial 
statements by both state-owned companies and companies with total 
assets of more than 19 million euros, revenues more than 38 million euros, 
and more than 250 employees — totaling about 1,100 companies.134 In 
addition, Denmark’s mandate extends to institutional investors, investment 
associations, and other listed financial businesses.135 The guidance notes to 
Denmark’s amended Financial Statements Act encourages the use of GRI 
guidelines to fulfill the reporting requirement.136  
The other EU countries have adopted similar legislation to implement 
the EU Modernisation Directive on corporate disclosure of non-financial 
information. Existing EU law mandates private companies to include non-
financial key performance indicators in their annual reports “where 
appropriate” and “[t]o the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
company's development, performance or position.”137 The European 
Commission is considering improvements to this policy because the 
requirements for disclosure (including indicators) are unclear and EU 
member states can choose to exempt small and medium-sized 
enterprises.138 The Commission hosted a series of workshops to explore 
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possible policy revisions in 2009 and 2010 and completed its public 
consultation in late January 2011.139 Among the recommendations that are 
being considered is for EU policy to use the GRI guidelines as a reference 
point for corporate reporting.140  
In addition to mandatory regulations, governments are issuing voluntary 
guidelines on sustainability reporting for companies and public agencies, 
many of which cite the GRI guidelines. For instance, Australia’s 
Department of Economics and Heritage issued a guide to reporting using 
GRI-consistent environmental indicators, and its Minerals Council (an 
industry group) recommends public sustainability reporting under GRI’s 
Mining and Metals Sector Supplement.141 The Canadian government has 
also endorsed the GRI for CSR reporting by the extractive sector.142 In 
2007, Japan released its Environmental Reporting Guidelines, which cite 
GRI guidelines and require environmental reporting for specified 
corporations.143 
Stock exchanges are another important driving force behind 
sustainability reporting. They are encouraging companies to be transparent 
as to their sustainability performance and, in some cases, mandating 
disclosure. Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange must disclose 
in their annual reports any non-financial information relevant to their 
business, although they do not have to file a full-length CSR report.144 In 
Australia, companies listed on its national exchange must disclose the 
extent to which they have followed the Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations, which include sustainability issues.145 Emerging 
market countries are also promoting voluntary standards in CSR reporting 
through the involvement of local stock exchanges. All companies listed on 
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the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are required to follow the King Report 
on Corporate Governance, which mandates integrated reporting that 
incorporates financial and non-financial information.146 China’s Shanghai 
Stock Exchange encourages companies to file annual CSR reports and 
develop a CSR strategy, and provides incentives for doing so, such as 
priority election into the prestigious Shanghai Corporate Governance 
Sector.147 The Bovespa Stock Exchange in Brazil has played an influential 
role in raising ESG standards among companies as part of an active 
national movement for more sustainable investment.148 Many exchanges 
have also created socially responsible investing indices.149 The motivation 
for this activity includes demand from investors for sustainability-related 
information and the development of specialized markets for sustainable 
investment niches, particularly in emerging market countries.150 Interest in 
sustainability issues is not restricted to socially responsible investors. In 
fact, there are more than 1100 asset owners, investment managers, and 
service providers with $32 trillion in assets that are signatories to the UN’s 
Principles for Responsible Investment, which promotes incorporation of 
ESG issues in investment analysis and decision making and disclosure of 
those issues in annual financial reports.151 
This brings us to the United States. U.S.-based companies have lagged 
in participation in the GRI, although there has been a significant increase 
in recent years.152 The SEC has been at the center of regulatory efforts to 
mandate corporate sustainability reporting. Over the past decade, advocacy 
and investor groups (including some of the largest U.S. pension funds) 
have successfully engaged with and formally petitioned the SEC to issue 
guidance on existing rules, increase shareholder rights, and develop new 
disclosure requirements. On October 27, 2009, the SEC reversed an 
existing policy (under Rule 14A-8(I)(7)) that had allowed companies to 
exclude shareholder resolutions requesting information on financial risks 
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associated with environmental, social, and human rights issues.153 In 
January 2010, the agency released an interpretive guidance note on the 
disclosure of climate change risks in financial filings.154 The note cited the 
GRI as a model for sustainability reporting in its 2010 guidance note 
regarding disclosure related to climate change.155 The premise behind the 
interpretation is that a company’s 10-K annual report should include 
discussion of material risks, which may include climate change and other 
sustainability-related risks. Notably, the guidance note cited the GRI as a 
model framework for sustainability reporting.  
There is current pressure on the SEC to require companies to assess 
and disclose on not only climate-related risks but also other material 
environmental, social, and governance risks. A petition to former SEC 
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro by an association of investment professionals 
proposed that the agency “require issuers to report annually on a 
comprehensive, uniform set of sustainability indicators . . . and that the 
SEC define this as the highest level of the current version of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting guidelines.”156  
Consistent with that request, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee 
(IAC) took an initial step towards considering ESG disclosure. The IAC 
was created by Chairwoman Schapiro in 2009 to give greater voice to 
investors and was regularly attended by several Commissioners as well as 
senior SEC officials.157 The Committee was recently codified as a 
permanent institution under the Dodd-Frank Act and will soon be 
reconstituted with members appointed by the entire Commission.158 
Among the IAC’s priorities was ESG disclosure, which was studied by the 
Investor as Owner Subcommittee. On May 18, 2010, the subcommittee 
met with a panel of experts on ESG issues, including the GRI’s Director 
of Sustainability Reporting.159 Before being temporarily disbanded in light 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, the subcommittee’s final resolution reflects a 
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recognition that ESG disclosure is a priority that should be addressed by 
the SEC: 
The Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory 
Committee believes that the SEC should develop dedicated internal 
resources to monitor and advise on developments regarding the 
disclosure of corporate social and environmental performance data. 
Activities could include: 
 Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of current US 
disclosure requirements and enforcement measures; 
 Monitoring global developments and participating in 
appropriate fora; 
 Serving as a point of contact for investors, issuers and other 
stakeholders on these issues; and  
 Making recommendations to the Commission where 
appropriate. 
The Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory 
Committee further believes that periodic public reports on these 
activities be produced.160 
The above resolution is not binding on the SEC, and it remains to be seen 
how much weight will be accorded to it by the yet-to-be constituted new 
IAC. 
There are a variety of obstacles that may prevent the SEC releasing 
additional guidance or requirements for ESG disclosure. The agency 
currently does not have the requisite expertise and capacity to make 
meaningful decisions on the costs and benefits of mandating 
environmental and social reporting. SEC officials perceive that there is 
insufficient interest among mainstream investors, as opposed to socially 
responsible investors.161 Moreover, while ESG disclosure remains on the 
SEC’s long-term agenda, it has become less of a short-term priority given 
the resources needed to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.162  
The Dodd-Frank Act includes three provisions that are particularly 
relevant to ESG reporting, which suggests the incremental fashion by 
which sustainability reporting is being mandated in the United States. 
Section 1502 imposes a new reporting requirement on publicly traded 
companies that manufacture products using certain conflict minerals.163 
For example, companies must identify whether the sourcing of the 
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minerals originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). If so, 
they must submit an independent private sector audit report on due 
diligence measures taken to avoid using minerals that directly or indirectly 
finance armed groups in the DRC.164 Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
imposes new disclosure requirements on mine safety.165 Mining companies 
must disclose in their annual and quarterly reports to the SEC on the 
safety and health requirements that apply to mines under the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Act of 1977.166 Finally, section 1504 requires natural 
resources companies to disclose certain payments made to governments 
for the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.167  
Outside of the SEC, there are notable efforts by federal agencies to 
incorporate GRI reporting. Under an executive order signed in January 
2010 entitled “Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and 
Economic Performance,” all federal agencies are required to issue a 
strategic sustainability performance plan.168 In addition to developing a 
plan that includes quantifiable metrics and sustainability goals, agencies 
must also inventory their greenhouse gas emissions and set targets to 
reduce their emissions by 2020.169 Each agency must also appoint a senior 
sustainability officer, and the Chair of the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) will report agency results to the President.170 Since the U.S. 
Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Postal Service already issue GRI-based 
reports, GRI representatives are lobbying the CEQ to recommend that all 
agencies issue their strategic sustainability performance plans under a GRI 
model.171 
Efforts to regulate sustainability reporting in the United States are still 
slow compared to efforts in other countries. In order to raise its U.S. 
profile, the GRI officially launched a focal point office in New York City 
on January 31, 2011.172 The opening ceremony took place at the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) with a panel discussion on “Why is America 
Letting the World Lead in Sustainability Reporting?” This event was a 
clear effort to engage financial leaders and information providers who 
could then motivate U.S. companies to report on sustainability using the 
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GRI. Among the participants at the event were Bloomberg and NYSE 
Euronext, the leading global operators of financial markets and providers 
of trading technologies.173 
An essential component of the GRI’s strategy in the United States is 
garnering and publicizing support of the initiative among market data 
providers. A significant development in this direction came in late 2009 
when Bloomberg began providing 120 ESG variables for public 
companies on its 250,000 data terminals.174 Users now have access to this 
data at no additional cost and can manipulate it in the same way as 
traditional financial metrics. By adding ESG data, Bloomberg recognizes 
that mainstream institutional investors, not just socially responsible 
investors, will increasingly consider sustainability performance in their 
investment decisions. In presentations to business associations and 
industry groups (including the Business Roundtable, the National 
Association of Corporate Directors, and the National Investor Relations 
Institute), the GRI highlights how Bloomberg and other information 
providers, such as Thomson Reuters, NASDAQ, RiskMetrics, and KLD 
Research & Analytics, rely on GRI reports when compiling ESG data.175 
According to a Bloomberg representative, “to make our content relevant 
to the marketplace, we needed to display the information exactly in the 
format provided by GRI, as this has become the market standard.”176 For 
instance, when a Bloomberg user selects a company’s water consumption 
variable, she is immediately linked to the company’s GRI report. If the 
company has not issued a report, then the cell will remain blank. The GRI 
hopes that companies will therefore feel pressure from investors to 
disclose their social and environmental data and, over time, improve their 
performance.177  
Rating agencies and sustainability indices are other potential avenues to 
pressure companies to report using the GRI. Many rating agencies build 
their methodologies around GRI indicators although they are not 
necessarily public about it.178 One index that explicitly relies on GRI 
metrics is NASDAQ’s Global Sustainability 50 Index.179 In the fall of 
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2009, the index removed twenty-three firms, including Cisco, Microsoft, 
and Oracle, for failing to disclose on a minimum of forty percent of core 
GRI indicators.180 While indices and rating agencies track reporting based 
on the indicators, however, they do not track performance or 
improvement over time. 
III. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF USING INDICATORS IN GOVERNANCE 
Indicators are not neutral instruments that can be applied mechanically. 
They are normative tools that embed certain values and shape behavior 
according to a standard.181 They also carry potential costs. Whether 
indicators play a beneficial or harmful role in turn can influence the 
perceived legitimacy of the government agencies and private actors that 
produce and rely on them.182 Whether civil society perceives an actor as 
legitimate will affect the agency’s right to govern, its claim to authority, and 
the likelihood of compliance with its directives.183 Based on personal 
interviews with GRI staff in Amsterdam and New York City, and 
observations at a GRI-certified training session, I will identify potential 
costs associated with using indicators, which challenge their effectiveness 
in meaningfully comparing units of analysis and evaluating performance. 
A. The Promotion of Box Ticking and Superficial Compliance 
The use of indicators risks producing a box ticking approach to 
compliance, which entails superficial or cosmetic changes without any 
substantive effects on behavior. Box ticking refers to a “rigid, mechanical 
practice involving the use of needlessly detailed ‘standardized checklists’ 
and pursued without regard to weighing costs against benefits.”184 The 
scientific authority of indicators and their focus on transparency can 
conceal behavioral changes (or the lack thereof) and lead to data gathering 
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for its own sake, with a preference for precise but not necessarily relevant 
data.185 As a result, indicators run the risk of promoting business interests 
at the expense of public interests, thus drawing regulation away from its 
primary purpose and not measuring what is important.186 Organizations 
that produce indicators may become more preoccupied with perpetuating 
their existence and raising their status, rather than using the indicators as a 
tool to shape behavior. In this way, the process of producing more and 
better indicators becomes an end in itself. 
When indicators are used in regulatory governance, there can be a 
slippage between their initial goals and intended audience, and the goals 
and audience that evolve over time. For instance, the GRI training session 
that I attended was exclusively focused on revising indicators and 
disclosing more information, rather than promoting its original aim of 
corporate accountability. When the GRI was founded, the intended 
audience for its reports was communities, consumers, non-governmental 
organizations, and shareholders who would presumably read the reports, 
encourage companies to improve their performance on sustainability 
issues, and thereby shift the balance of power in corporate governance.187 
However, the focus of the GRI’s activities has now become the users (the 
companies) — the GRI devotes significant resources to developing 
learning tools, training courses, and services for report preparers and 
users.188 A GRI official that I interviewed admitted that the GRI’s main 
audience is companies and that its primary motivation is to increase 
company participation.189 Here we see a gap between the GRI’s stated goal 
of multi-stakeholder consensus-building and its actual operations. 
The GRI is no longer aimed at empowering its original audience to hold 
corporations accountable. For instance, it is questionable who actually 
reads the reports. According to one study, “there is widespread agreement 
that the [GRI] reports are not studied in any detail.”190 My interviews 
revealed that GRI officials themselves acknowledge the low readership of 
GRI reports.191 Even among those actors that read the reports, many do 
not find them useful. A major U.S. environmental NGO representative 
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noted: “We don’t really use GRI reports . . . . [A] single number is not 
enough; we are interested in [the] strategies and plans behind the 
numbers.”192 Others noted that the information “does not give an 
adequate picture of the impacts on local communities, . . . [and] is too 
processes oriented, rather than [focused on] performance.”193 NGOs also 
do not trust the data, which usually is not verified by a third party. They 
only pay attention to whether a company releases a report but not its 
actual content. What becomes important then is simply the procedural 
exercise of filling out a report or, in other words, superficial compliance. 
The GRI’s application levels further reinforce its focus on transparency 
for its own sake rather than actual improvements in behavior. Recall that 
the GRI attaches an application level to a report largely based on the 
number of indicators that a company reports on.194 A company receives an 
“A” if it reports on at least fifty indicators, a “B” for twenty, and a “C” for 
ten.195 That means that a company that is destroying the environment 
could nevertheless get an “A” for reporting on fifty or more indicators (as 
well as disclosing its management approach). Thus, the application levels 
are based on the level of disclosure, rather than the quality and accuracy of 
a firm’s actual performance. One GRI official admitted that there is a 
general misconception that the application levels serve as a ranking based 
on quality of performance, rather than an objective classification of the 
level of transparency: 
What we’ve seen is that it’s . . . a challenge on the communication 
side. So often the levels have been presented as being a grade or a 
quality mark or a performance related statement, which has been 
quite difficult for us to counteract. I mean, whenever we came 
across something like that we would contact the company and then 
ask them to change the statement, but of course, since we’re an 
international organization you can never ensure that you find 
everything . . . . That’s also inherent in the system [of] “A,” “B,” 
and “C” in a U.S. context. It has a completely different connotation 
in the European context, for instance [where school grades are 
numeric].196 
Another GRI official explained that it may be more worthwhile for a 
company to devote resources to managing change and improving 
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performance rather than moving up levels for its own sake.197 Moreover, 
external verification is only optional, and a company could add a “+” to its 
application level even if only a small portion of its report has been 
externally verified.198 Third-party verifiers like accounting firms do not 
have to comply with a uniform assurance standard.199 Here we see that the 
motivation behind the producers of the GRI is not that the reports are 
actually read by NGOs or whether they reflect a company’s good or bad 
performance, but that more and more companies participate and release 
reports. As the GRI enhances its profile and perpetuates its status as the 
market leader in sustainability reporting, it may be undermining its 
legitimacy and the purported goals behind its indicators. 
B. The Dominance of Technical Experts over Decision Making 
Because indicators rely on numerically-rendered data, technical experts 
(both within government agencies and private actors) exercise considerable 
power over decision making and the interpretation of legal norms. While 
their specialized knowledge and political neutrality can be a benefit for 
policy making,200 it is difficult for stakeholders to challenge the power of 
experts and their methodology and assumptions in producing the 
indicators. Since indicators carry scientific authority, they mask potential 
conflicts of interest among technical experts and leave little room for 
contestation. This is the case for the GRI, where accounting firms are 
heavily involved in both indicator production and data verification. 
Providing assurance for sustainability reports has become a growing 
business, especially for accounting companies that have been seeking 
credibility following the Enron scandal.201 As a result, “[a] large service 
industry comprised largely of sustainability consultancies and auditing 
firms has emerged around the revisions of the guidelines, preparations of 
reports, their verification, stakeholder outreach, and various efforts to 
standardize and institutionalize the above activities.”202 These firms 
arguably derive more economic benefit from the GRI than any other 
stakeholder. In fact, some firms such as KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
and Deloitte have recently established global sustainability practice groups 
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that specifically focus on corporate sustainability measurement and 
reporting.203  
The role of accounting firms as independent third-parties is dubious 
given that they are actively governing the same organization that they are 
presumably regulating. Representatives from large accounting firms 
occupy key positions in the GRI’s governance structure, including the 
Board of Directors, from which they advise on the methodology and 
interpretation of indicators.204 In an informational brochure about its 
sustainability practice, Deloitte advertises that it: 
has been involved in every stage of the GRI’s growth and 
development . . . . Deloitte member firms were involved in the 
2002 revision of the GRI guidelines, as well as the 2006 revision at 
which the current G3 guidelines were drafted. Many Deloitte 
member firm professionals have played key roles in the GRI 
governance and stakeholder bodies . . . . Moreover, Deloitte 
member firm teams both advise clients on reporting and assurance 
according to GRI guidelines and collaborate . . . on GRI-sponsored 
training.205 
The big four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) have also recently sponsored the GRI’s new 
U.S. office for the first two years.206 Yet these same firms also have a stake 
in increasing the market for their services. Given that the firms may 
provide other services to their clients, such as financial auditing, they have 
an interest in trying to package their financial and non-financial services 
together. More companies using GRI and seeking external assurance 
represents a significant revenue opportunity for the big accounting firms. 
Given the proliferation of performance codes, standards, and other 
forms of voluntary self-regulation, the “third-party assurance industry” is 
becoming increasingly influential in the interpretation of legal norms in a 
variety of areas.207 Accountants are thus exercising authority over how 
legal norms are valued, interpreted, measured, and verified.208 Given their 
                                                          
203. See Tilt, supra note 200. 
204. See Board of Directors, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://tinyurl.com/n4eq328 (last 
visited July 24, 2013). 
205. DELOITTE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING: THE EMERGING CHALLENGE 2–3 (2010), 
available at http://tinyurl.com/m24e8ka. 
206. Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative, New GRI Focal Point Helps U.S. Companies 
Improve Sustainability (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/nx7or7o. 
207. See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. 
L. 325 (2008). 
208. A handful of law firms are beginning to catch up to accounting firms by opening corporate 
social responsibility practice groups, but lawyering in this area is still in its early stages. See, e.g., 
Corporate Social Responsibility Practice, FOLEY HOAG LLP, http://tinyurl.com/lq6pkvf (last visited June 
24, 2013). 
2013] REGULATING THROUGH NUMBERS  611 
conflict of interest, sensitive issues may be left out by assurance providers 
for fear of upsetting their clients.209 In the case of the GRI where the 
verification of data often involves law-related issues such as the application 
of international human rights and environmental standards, accountants 
arguably lack the professional competence to conduct a proper 
evaluation.210 Surprisingly, there are no legal experts on the GRI’s 
Technical Advisory Committee, so their participation in the production of 
GRI guidelines and the interpretation of indicators is limited to 
consultations with Organizational Stakeholders.211 
C. The Distortion of Public Values into Numbers 
When indicators do not accurately represent the social phenomena that 
they are intended to evaluate, they lose their effectiveness as regulatory 
tools. This risk particularly applies to the use of indicators to measure 
public values that are non-instrumental and difficult to translate into 
numbers. Legal norms may then be interpreted in a managerial way that 
distorts their original meaning.212 In the case of the GRI, issues that are 
easy to quantify, such as greenhouse gas emissions, are prioritized. At the 
same time, issues such as human rights and community impact are 
subordinated or even diluted as they are translated into mere business 
risks. In this way, indicators may lead to better performance on certain 
issues by relying on the power of numbers, but may neglect those issues 
that are difficult to quantify. So instead of the maxim “what is measured 
gets done,” in fact in reality, what is easy to measure may be the only thing 
that gets done. 
While quantification may be appropriate for many environmental or 
health and safety issues, it is difficult to capture other material information 
in measurable quantities. For instance, critics argue that the subjection of 
certain issues to cost-benefit analysis (as it is currently structured) may 
strip them of their intrinsic value.213 As the GRI develops its fourth 
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generation of guidelines, there is disagreement over the extent to which 
indicators can (or should) be solely based on quantitative data: 
The challenge is to what extent can we put the sustainability issues 
into measurable figures. Is that possible? Should we move to that 
completely or should we also allow for context-related information? 
So that’s going to be a big discussion when we start up G4. But 
what we’ve seen is that the information that the investors are 
looking for are actually these numbers to a large extent.214 
The debate over quantification emerged most recently over revision of the 
GRI’s human rights indicators. 
According to a report by the GRI’s Human Rights Reporting Working 
Group, it has been challenging to develop appropriate performance 
indicators in this area.215 For instance, one of the human rights indicators 
in the G3 guidelines is “total hours of employee training on policies and 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to 
operations, including the percentage of employees trained.”216 Yet the 
number of employee training hours does not necessarily correlate with 
positive human rights outcomes. Another GRI indicator is “total number 
of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people and actions 
taken.”217 By exclusively relying on a quantitative measure, this indicator 
does not give information about the seriousness of the violations or the 
length of time over which they occurred. Good reporting requires more 
than just quantitative data: 
[I]t is necessary to disaggregate performance data . . . . The report 
should pay adequate attention to both narrative and quantitative 
data . . . . As a general point, all quantitative indicators have 
minimal meaning as isolated pieces of information. Numbers can 
indicate how often events have occurred, but will provide little or 
no insight into quality (e.g., 100 hours of training does not reflect 
whether it was effective or ineffective; 1 million Euros of revenue 
does not describe sources of the revenue or their relative 
importance to overall strategy). Therefore, all quantitative indicators 
must be read in the context of other information and the relative 
value of quantitative indicators must be judged in terms of how 
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well it contributes to understanding in combination with the other 
required disclosures.218 
In other words, public values such as human rights cannot be captured by 
numbers alone. Despite the working group’s report, the GRI is moving in 
the direction of more quantification and the translation of all issues into 
potential financial risks. 
As part of its efforts to streamline indicators and mainstream reporting, 
the GRI recently announced a goal that by 2020, all companies will adopt 
an integrated report.219 This means that a company would release a single 
annual report that includes indicators for both financial and non-financial 
information.220 The purpose of an integrated report is to raise the status of 
non-financial information and demonstrate its relationship to a company’s 
core business strategy. Yet if integrated reporting one day became the 
norm and ultimately replaced sustainability reports, then the standard for 
including environmental and social issues would be financial materiality — 
that is, the same standard used for financial statements under the SEC 
based on what a reasonable investor would consider important in making 
an investment decision.221 Therefore, issues like human rights, which are 
materially important for communities and NGOs but may not necessarily 
be financially material, may be left out of an integrated report.222  
The GRI’s progression towards integrated reporting represents an effort 
to translate public values into financial terms and transform them into 
business risks. In the case of human rights, what is developing is a risk 
management approach that defines potential violations as strategic risks, 
which may damage a company’s reputation, threaten its profits, and lead to 
possible litigation.223 While risk management has become increasingly 
common in public and private governance,224 what are the implications for 
it being applied to more value-laden issues such as human rights? 
Translating rights into financial risks and indicators may emphasize their 
regulatory dimension (including their instrumental, rule-oriented, and 
administrative qualities) but disregard their sovereignty dimension (which 
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invokes their universal character, symbolic valence, and emancipatory 
power).225 As a result, human rights indicators that rely exclusively on 
quantitative measurement may distort the legal norms on which they are 
based and challenge the usefulness of these tools to effectively evaluate 
performance. 
IV. HOW TO ENHANCE THE PROMISE AND MINIMIZE THE PERILS OF 
INDICATORS 
Given the potential costs of using indicators in legal governance, how 
can we enhance their effectiveness as regulatory instruments? I argue that 
indicators are useful tools that provide important benefits to the 
policymaking process. But they are not ends in themselves. Their ultimate 
goal should be improving performance and changing long-term behavior. 
Towards that end, I draw upon my case study of the GRI to propose the 
following recommendations. These prescriptions apply to both regulatory 
actors such as government agencies that incorporate indicators into 
decision making, as well as private actors such as the GRI that produce 
indicators and shape regulation. 
A. Design Meaningful Indicators and Rankings 
In order to avoid box ticking and superficial compliance, regulators 
should design meaningful indicators that measure information that is 
relevant to stakeholders, can be reasonably collected, and addresses issues 
on which change is most needed. A meaningful indicator would be one 
where an improvement in the number implies that things actually got 
better on the ground. Towards that end, it is important to balance 
structure-based and process-based indicators with outcome-based 
indicators.226 Structure-based indicators focus on the legal and institutional 
framework and organizational inputs, such as the adoption of a policy or 
equipment type. Process-based indicators measure the efforts made to 
meet obligations and achieve performance outcomes, such as levels of 
spending on female primary education or the percentage of employees 
trained in an organization’s anti-corruption policies. Outcome-oriented 
indicators measure how well one’s initiatives are accomplishing the 
intended results, such as total greenhouse gas emissions or an increase in 
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literacy rates. These last indicators are the most critical type because they 
track progress over time and assess whether or not performance is 
improving or worsening. In contrast, process indicators frequently do not 
track changes from year to year and do not focus on the extent of 
implementation of processes.227  
The relevance of the GRI indicators is a primary concern for NGOs, 
community groups, and consumers, many of whom are currently not 
reading the GRI reports in depth and do not trust the GRI application 
levels.228 Until recently, the GRI indicators (particularly those on human 
rights) were primarily structure- and process-based. Yet in an effort to 
address stakeholders and make their indicators more meaningful, the GRI 
has added additional outcome-based indicators.229 For instance, the new 
indicators on human rights are: (i) percentage of operations that are 
subject to human rights impact assessments; and (ii) number of grievances 
related to human rights that were filed and resolved through formal 
grievance mechanisms.230 These metrics will measure the degree to which 
policies are being implemented and ultimately whether rights are being 
progressively realized.  
It is also critical to design meaningful rankings that reflect a company’s 
quality of performance and its improvement over time, rather than simply 
its level of transparency. Not only is the GRI’s grading system only based 
on the number of indicators reported by a company, but it also prioritizes 
“core” indicators over “additional” ones that may nonetheless be 
materially important to stakeholders. For instance, the GRI’s only 
indicator on indigenous rights (which measures the total number of 
incidents of violations involving the rights of indigenous people and 
actions taken) is categorized as “additional.”231 As a result, companies with 
an “A” application level do not have to report on an indicator that is 
critical for affected communities and certain civil society organizations.   
But how does one overcome the difficulties of translating value-laden 
issues like human rights into numbers? Measuring human rights is 
worthwhile given that it provides a number of benefits: “(1) contextual 
description, monitoring, and documentation of violations; (2) classification 
of different types of violations; (3) mapping and pattern recognition of 
violations over space and time; and (4) secondary analysis that provides 
explanations for violations and policy solutions for reducing them in the 
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future.”232 However, quantitative measurement is insufficient to capture 
the full meaning of human rights. Therefore, producers of indicators 
should rely on both quantitative data and qualitative information (in 
textual or descriptive form) when measuring public values. These methods 
are complementary and interdependent ways of understanding a 
phenomenon. Quantitative metrics can provide evidence of whether a 
violation is widespread or systematic, while qualitative information can 
contextualize the problem, establish causal relationships, and clarify why a 
situation has arisen. 
B. Avoid Data Overload 
When identifying meaningful indicators, one must be careful of data 
overload as a result of having too many indicators. Having more data does 
not necessarily mean facilitating better decision-making. As I observed 
with the GRI, there is a tendency to think that technology is the answer. 
Alan Knight, the Associate Senior Partner of AccountAbility (a global 
non-profit organization that provides advisory services and creates 
standards on sustainability) expressed his concern over the reliance on 
technology to produce effective corporate reporting: “Technology is very 
good with data. But data must be debated, analyzed, and considered. 
Technology can help this process of analysis and consideration but should 
not be relied on to provide ready-made answers. Technology is only a tool. 
The buck can never stop at a tool.”233 Simply focusing on information 
disclosure through indicators may actually be counterproductive because it 
may appear as greenwashing. The ultimate goal should be embedding 
certain norms into company culture. Telefónica, S.A., a Spanish company 
that has effectively used the GRI indicators towards changing behavior 
states: 
CR [(Corporate responsibility)] reports provide a management 
platform similar to an iceberg structure. On top, we have indicators 
as the piece of information that is visible in the report. Second, we 
have systems and processes implemented in the company, not 
visible to stakeholders, that help to produce and collect all 
information within the company. And finally, we verify both 
indicators and processes to make sure CR issues are implemented 
properly. So finally, CR reports are a driver to speed up the CSR 
implementation within the company.234 
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Indicators are just the tip of the iceberg that includes a larger strategy for 
change. 
The GRI’s focus on disclosing more and more information (resulting in 
as many as seventy-nine performance indicators) has led to a deviation 
from its goals. The large number of indicators discourages companies 
from adopting the GRI, especially U.S. companies whose corporate 
counsel fear the litigation risk attached to too much disclosure. On the 
part of investors and government officials in the SEC, there is a concern 
that GRI reports are not sufficiently streamlined and not focused on 
performance outcomes.235 Some regulatory bodies argue that before 
mandating any kind of corporate sustainability reporting, they first need a 
much smaller set of key performance indicators that are clearly linked with 
financial materiality.236 What is currently under debate is which key 
performance indicators are the most appropriate for each industry.237 
C. Require Third-Party Verification 
Indicators are not meaningful if there is little confidence in the 
information that they provide. It must be costly for actors to disclose false 
information, which they are arguably more prone to doing under self-
monitoring systems. In order to ensure the quality and reliability of the 
data that feeds into indicators, regulatory agencies should require 
verification by an independent third party. Possible third parties include 
NGOs or auditing firms, as long as they are not directly involved in the 
production or governance of the indicators.  
The lack of a third-party assurance requirement affects the 
trustworthiness of GRI reporting, as viewed by investors and NGOs. 
Third-party assurance (where a firm will certify whether a company 
conforms to a relevant standard) is currently optional under the G3 
guidelines, and there is not a uniform auditing standard that the GRI 
requires when an audit is carried out.238 Due to the possibility that 
companies may be tempted to misrepresent data so as to enhance their 
public reputation, the public and NGOs frequently do not trust the 
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reports.239 The GRI has been thus far reluctant to require independent 
audits, likely because the cost of doing so may dissuade companies from 
participating. Thus many private actors rely on self-monitoring regimes 
rather than external assurance. In such cases, I recommend an 
evolutionary strategy whereby verification would be required only after 
there is a critical mass of participants. I argue that the GRI has already 
achieved that level and is now suffering from a credibility deficit for not 
requiring third-party assurance. Another alternative is to institute a 
probabilistic auditing model, whereby companies would contribute to a 
GRI-managed fund that would pay for auditing of approximately 10% of 
participating companies.240 
Independent verification is also critical for indicators that are produced 
for, or used by, regulatory agencies. Since agencies have limited resources 
to conduct direct oversight, the costs of verification should be spread 
among program participants.241 While self-monitoring is cost-effective, the 
absence of verification has led to under-compliance in such programs as 
Responsible Care and the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).242 In contrast, 
such initiatives as the EPA’s Environmental Leadership Program, the 
European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, and California’s 
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program do rely on third-party verification 
entities that are certified by the government.243 Any government program 
that incorporates indicators should similarly require assurance because 
“[w]ithout verification, self-reporters will become lax, and likely lean 
towards underreporting if that is in their self-interest.”244 
Assurance providers should follow standardized and transparent criteria 
and procedures that are publicly disclosed.245 They should avoid, or at least 
disclose, conflicts of interest with the reporting company — for instance, 
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an auditing firm should not serve as verifier for a company if it has 
designed the company’s CSR policies or processes.246 In addition, the same 
firms that provide assurance should not be concurrently involved in the 
governance of the indicators, as is currently the case for the GRI. Finally, 
governments should regulate the third-party assurance providers through 
certification or accreditation, or delegate oversight to an independent 
entity.247 
D. Expand Participation by Citizens and a Broad Group of Experts 
Given the technical nature of indicators, experts should naturally play a 
role in their design and verification. However, there is a risk that they may 
exercise undue influence over decision making, exhibit conflicts of interest, 
and leave little room for public contestation. The dominance of experts 
(especially accounting professionals) can undermine the legitimacy of the 
institutions that produce the indicators Ensuring citizen participation in 
rulemaking is an important goal in administrative law.248 It is especially 
critical in the use of indicators, whose scientific appearance makes them 
less open to being challenged by external parties. By broadening public 
participation and including a broad group of experts, regulatory entities 
can avoid capture by technical experts and the promotion of industry 
interests at the expense of public interests.  
Private actors and government agencies should expand participation by 
the public and NGOs in the design of indicators and engage them in the 
reporting process. The GRI exhibits several important mechanisms in this 
regard that other actors should adopt — for instance, its multi-stakeholder 
consultation process for the design and governance of indicators; its 
evolutionary approach that allows periodic review and revision of 
indicators by interested parties; and transparency in the methods used to 
produce indicators. Yet despite these praiseworthy procedures, the 
organization has strayed from its goal of empowering civil society 
organizations to make informed decisions and seek greater accountability 
for corporate governance. Since it was founded,  
[c]onsiderable attention [has been] . . . paid to ensuring collaboration 
from major multinational corporations and propounding the 
business case for social reporting, while activists and labor [have] 
received less attention. These strategic choices and compromises 
                                                          
246. See Penelope Simons, Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of 
Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes, 1/1/2004 RELATIONSIND. 101, 126–27 (2004). 
247. See Gabriela Llobet, “Trust but Verify”: Verification in the Joint Implementation Regime, 31 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 233, 263–64 (1997–1998). 
248. For a comprehensive review of the literature on this topic, see Cary Coglianese, Citizen 
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2005–2006).    
620 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 53:575 
[have] shaped the path of the emerging institution, so that the 
corporate sector plays an increasingly prominent role, while activists 
find themselves somewhat marginalized.249  
According to one study, the low readership of GRI reports by civil society 
organizations is due to inadequate outreach by the GRI secretariat, the 
uneven quality and trustworthiness of reports, and the information that is 
too process-oriented to be useful for activist tactics.250 As the latter two 
issues have already been addressed above, it is important to address the 
need to balance representation among experts and civil society within the 
GRI’s governance system. Corporate interests currently exert considerable 
influence over the design of indicators and reporting requirements. 
Therefore, the GRI should set guidelines to ensure that large businesses 
and international consulting and accounting firms do not continue to 
dominate the group of Organizational Stakeholders, who vote for 
members of the Stakeholder Council and approve nominations for Board 
of Directors.251 The challenge will be how to select the most representative 
civil society groups to participate in the GRI governance bodies. 
In addition to civil society participation, experts from a variety of 
disciplines should contribute to the indicator production and verification 
processes. In the case of the GRI, accounting professionals have been 
overly representative in these processes although they lack the professional 
competence to evaluate all types of indicators. Since many of the GRI 
indicators draw from legal norms, lawyers should be involved in their 
design through representation on the Technical Advisory Committee. 
International human rights, labor, and environmental lawyers would not 
only provide needed expertise, but they could also facilitate greater 
company adoption of GRI guidelines. In the United States, a lack of 
support by corporate counsel has been a significant obstacle towards 
participation in the GRI by U.S. companies.252 Inside counsel are 
frequently hesitant to publicly disclose their companies’ social and 
environmental impacts for fear of future litigation.253 Another possible 
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litigation concern involves a company disclosing “material” information in 
a voluntary sustainability report that has not been included in a regulatory 
filing under federal securities law.254 Since corporate counsel are usually the 
ones to decide whether a company will participate in the GRI, lawyers 
should be more involved in the GRI in order to appropriately design the 
indicators and promote the guidelines to companies. Moreover, assurance 
providers should include a broad group of experts in their teams of 
verifiers, including not only lawyers but also environmental scientists and 
anthropologists with knowledge of the local cultural context.255 
CONCLUSION 
What are the unintended consequences of using metrics in decision 
making? Are indicators measuring what is critical towards changing 
behavior? How can we more effectively use these tools to minimize their 
costs and enhance their benefits?  
In this Article, I have sought to answer these questions by drawing on 
an empirical study of the Global Reporting Initiative. I demonstrate that 
indicators do not just serve as instruments to regulate behavior; they 
themselves have normative authority and may be fraught with problems. 
Indicators are playing an important role in governance given their ability to 
simplify and translate social phenomena into a numerical representation 
that is easy to understand and comparable across actors. They have 
become particularly prevalent in international law as a mechanism to 
increase compliance and operationalize global norms. Yet as indicators 
hide behind a veil of scientific truth and neutrality, they mask potential 
problems: the promotion of box-ticking and superficial compliance; the 
dominance of technical experts over decision making; and the distortion of 
public values into numbers.  
Like all tools, indicators can be misused and manipulated in a way that 
strays from their purported goals and intended audiences. Their costs 
threaten to outweigh their benefits if they are not designed meaningfully 
and if there is little confidence in the information that they provide. 
Therefore, regulatory bodies should not treat indicators as ends in and of 
themselves, but rather as a means towards evaluating performance and 
ultimately improving behavior. 
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